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Abstract
The paper proposes an empirical framework with endogenous ight frequency and
quantity decisions on an airline market. The framework is built around the hypothesis
that passengers value not only the ticket price but also the cost of delay associated with
an airline. At sample mean values, the cost of delay is estimated to account for 34% of
the $280 full price of a seat on a ight.
Marketing alliances increase the demand from connecting passengers for seats on a
ight. Simulation results show that airlines respond to this increase by ying fewer local
(nonstop) passengers rather than by increasing their ight frequency on a market.1. Introduction
In January 98, Northwest and Continental Airlines announced that they were forming
a marketing alliance and, in April 98, American and US Airways, Delta and United
Airlines followed with similar statements. While marketing alliances had long been a
part of the airline industry, this was the rst time that major US airlines announced
their intention to link up their domestic ight operations1.
The denition of a marketing alliance between airlines is that the carriers involved
will be able to market and sell tickets on their partners ights, a practice known as code
sharing. Frequent yer programs will also be linked, giving members more destinations
to choose from (New York Times, 04/24/98). This paper analyzes how code sharing
changes, all else equal, the frequency, quantity, and pricing choices of airlines within
alliances2. It is written amid growing concern in policy circles that ticket prices are
rising and service quality is decreasing. The fear is that marketing alliances among the
few remaining major airlines will only worsen these problems.
To better understand the concept of code sharing, some terminology is necessary.
Airline customers are identied by an origin and a destination airport. For example,
B-D customers y from airport B to airport D. A local B-D passenger is a B-D customer
who takes a nonstop ight on market B-D. A connecting B-D passenger travel on an
1Notes: [1] As of the summer of 1999, only the Northwest-Continental alliance has evolved to code
sharing. The American-US Airways and Delta-United alliances have only, to this point, linked frequent
￿yer programs. [2] In the 1980￿s, while expanding their hub-and-spoke operations, major airlines entered
into alliances with (and some eventually acquired) the commuter airlines feeding passengers to their hub
airports from small and mid-size communities. In the recession of the early 1990￿s, US airlines turned
to foreign carriers for alliances and, thereby, extended the reach of their domestic network abroad (i.e.,
cabotage and foreign ownership laws prevent an airline from o⁄ering ￿ights within a foreign country).
2Issues such as whether alliances will encourage collusion, lead partners to serve new markets or
exit from jointly served markets, are important topics, but they are corollaries to the de￿nition of a
marketing alliance. They are not considered in this paper. Note that there have always been secondary
aspects to alliances. The 1980 alliances were a way for hub airlines to secure the pipeline of passengers
to their hubs. Commuter airlines had also the know-how and aircraft equipment necessary to serve at
lower costs small and mid-size communities. The 1990 alliances were acompanied by major cash and
equity investments by foreign carriers into their US counterparts. There are also equity considerations
to the 1998 alliance between Northwest and Continental. It is also argued that the US carriers are trying
to extend the antitrust immunity which the Department of Justice granted international alliances, to
their domestic alliances.
2indirect route from airport B to D. An indirect route is a path made up of ights which
links two airports and requires at least one stop at an intermediate airport. Hence,
on a ight on a amrket B-D, an airline can, and does in practice, y both local B-D
and connecting passengers, where these connecting passsengers have for origin and/or
destination an airport other than B or D.
It is a fact that connecting passengers dislike switching airlines on an indirect route
and there are revenue (lack of) sharing incentives for airlines to keep a connecting pas-
senger on its ights. Code sharing allows an airline to brand one of its partners ights
as its own and establishes a formal framework for revenue sharing. This expands the
range of indirect routes an airlines ights can be a part of. This, in turn, increases the
number of connecting passengers an airline can sell seats to on a ight.
The policy concern with code sharing is that, in response to the increase in the
demand from connecting passengers, airlines will raise ticket prices for local passengers
and, thereby, decrease the number of passengers ying nonstop. For example, Bamberger
and Carlton (1993) provide empirical evidence to that e¤ect.
I analyze this issue from an empirical framework which endogenizes airlines ight
frequency and quantity choices. This framework is built upon the hypothesis that a
customer values not only the ticket price charged by an airline but the cost of delay
associated with traveling with that airline; that is, customers value the full price of a
seat. The full price is dened as the sum of the ticket price and the cost of delay.
The cost of delay specication incorporates both the positive and negative externali-
ties that come with increased passenger volume on an airline market. A higher passenger
volume on market increases the cost of delay (a negative externality) because a passen-
ger is more likely to encounter crowded aircraft and longer than usual check-in lines,
plane boarding/exiting times, and baggage retrieval times. However, higher passenger
volumes have, at some point, to be accompanied by an increase in the number of ights.
A higher frequency of ights decreases the cost of delay (a positive externality) since a
passenger is more likely to nd an ight departure closer to his desired departure time.
This concept dates back to Douglas and Miller (1972), and full price specications have
3long been a part of the theoretical airline literature (Dorman (1976), Panzar (1979),
Berechman and Shy (1993), Lederer (1993)).
The model species aggregated demand functions for each of local and connecting
passengers, and cost functions for each of ight frequency, connecting and local pas-
sengers. The estimated systems of equations are the rst-order conditions and demand
equations which characterize optimal/equilibrium ight frequency and quantity choices
on market. From these and the estimation results (based on third quarter 1993 data),
the reader is able to explicitly account for the interaction between ight frequency, quan-
tity, and ticket prices on an airline market. There lies the benets of this model. It is
also the rst empirical model, to my knowledge, to endogenize the strategic e¤ects of
ight frequency choices.
There are two main ndings to the estimation results. First, the data provide support
for the empirical framework in that estimated parameter values have signs consistent
with the economic and institutional details of the model. For example, slope parameters
have the correct signs and are signicantly di¤erent from zero; customers assign a positive
valuation to the cost of delay. Second, at sample mean values, the cost of delay is
estimated to amount to 34% of the cost of delay of the $280 full price of a seat to a
local passenger. The cost of frequency delay accounts for 90% ($85) of this cost of delay.
These results also provide the marginal worth to a local passenger (ying coach) of an
extra ight per day, per airline on a market. For example, if an airline increases its
number of daily ights from 2 to 3 on a market, that additional ight is worth $18.52 to
a local B-D passenger. If the increase is from 3 to 4 daily ights, that additional ight
is worth $11.04.
Upon estimation of the model, I modify the data for the sample markets to reect a
setting with marketing alliances between each of Continental and Northwest, American
and US Airways, Delta and United. This denes an alliance sample data.G i v e n t h e
estimated parameter values for the model, I simulate the ight frequency, quantities and
prices for the markets in the alliance sample data.
Alliances increase the demand from connecting passengers for seats on a ight on
4a market. In response, the simulation results show that airlines increase the number
of connecting passengers they serve. However, they respond to this increase by serving
fewer local passengers rather than by increasing their ight frequency on the market.
Fewer passengers y nonstop in an industry with alliances.
A nal comment is warranted. To estimate a complete model of airline interaction, I
must parametrize the functional forms for the demand and costs functions in the model.
Results are dependent upon these specication choices. It is therefore important to view
the paper as providing an empirical framework with endogenous decision-making for the
analysis of marketing alliances. There lies the primary interest of the paper.
(greater discussion of results, with numbers, forthcoming in next draft, due very
shortly) for marketing alliances stress a very simple point. Ticket prices may rise for
local passengers due to an increase in stochastic delay, but full prices may fall due to a
decrease in frequency delay. Given local passengers value the full price of a seat, they
stand to gain from alliances. More passengers y nonstop on the sample markets with
alliances.
The economic intuition is sraightforward. Since the marginal cost of a passenger is
lower than that of ight frequency, an exogenous increase in the demand from connecting
passengers increases more than proportionately the passenger volume relative to ight
frequency. This raises ticket prices. However, frequency delay is assigned a higher dollar
value than stochastic delay. This means that a marginal increase in ight frequency
may lead to a greater decrease in the cost of delay than the increase in delay generated
from the marginal increase in the passenger volume. The interest of the paper is that
I endogenously estimate all relevant parameters to this argument. In fact, the analysis
goes beyond this simple argument since the model provides the expected frequency,
quantity, and prices for market with alliances.
5Section 2 presents the theoretical components to the model. Section 3 introduces the
reader to the data. Section 4 discusses the empirical model and its estimation is detailed
in section 5. Section 6 contains the results and section 7 concludes. Most tables are
listed after the conclusion. The appendices provide additional information on the data,
the model, the estimation and the results.
2. The Theoretical Model
2.1. Flights and Indirect Routes
A ight denotes a single nonstop (direct) trip identied by an origin and a destination
airport and a departure time. An indirect route is a path made up of ights which
links two airports and requires at least one stop at an intermediate airport. Flights and
indirect routes are, to the extent both are present on an airport-pair market, substitutes.
Customers are identied by an origin and destination airport. For example, B-D
customers have airport B for origin and airport D for destination. A local B-D passenger
is a B-D customer who takes a ight on market B-D. A connecting B-D passenger is a
B-D customer who travels on an indirect route from airport B to airport D. An airline
with ight(s) on a market from airport B to airport D (i.e., market B-D) is competing
for B-D passengers with airlines o¤ering indirect routes on market B-D (see gure 1).
2.2. Amendments to the Denition of an Indirect Route
Connecting passengers who take all ights on an indirect route with the same airline
are said to connect online. If a connecting passenger switches airlines on an indirect
route, that passenger is said to interline. It is a fact that connecting passengers prefer
online to interline connections and that there are revenue (lack of) sharing incentives
for airlines to keep a connecting passenger on its ights3. Morrison and Winston (1995,
3Carlton, Landes & Posner (1980) estimate that travelers would be willing to pay nearly $37 (in 1993
dollars) more for a ￿ight with an on-line connection than one with an interline connection. The bene￿ts
from on-line connections include a shorter walk in the terminal to ctach the connecting ￿ight, greater
6p.22) document that, by 1994, fewer than 1% of connecting passengers switch airlines
on their indirect routes. This leads me to restrict the denition of an indirect route to
paths where all ights are served by the same airline.
An airline o¤ers ights across a network of markets. It can therefore include a ight
on a market B-D into the path of indirect routes between some airports Ai and Ej,w i t h
Ai 6= Ba n d / o rE j 6= D (see gure 1 for an illustration). For example, airport Ai (Ei)
may be any origin (destination) airport on a market to airport B (from airport D) where
the airline has ights. Given I do not model the choice of departure times for ights, I do
not di¤erentiate among departure times for indirect routes. Namely, an indirect route
o nm a r k e tB - Di sr e d e  n e da sap a t hm a d eu po fm a r k e t sw i t h i g h t sf r o mt h es a m e
airline which links airports B and D and requires at least one stop at an intermediate
airport. To illustrate, all indirect routes from Seattle (SEA) to Miami (MIA) made up
of a SEA-Dallas (DFW) and a DFW-MIA ight count as one indirect route from SEA
to MIA, irrespective of di¤erences in departure times.
The number of indirect routes a ight on market B-D can be a part of is, therefore,
proportional to the number of markets which an airline services with ights, into airport
B and from airport D. The greater the number of these markets, the greater the number
of Ai-Ej markets the airline may draw connecting passengers from. In this paper, an
airline with ights on market B-D is said to face the demands from two aggregated
groups of customers: local B-D and connecting A-E customers.
2.3. Marketing Alliances
The concept of a marketing alliance is that the carriers involved will be able to market
and sell tickets on their partners ights, a practice known as code sharing. Frequent yer
programs will also be linked, giving members more destinations to choose from (New
York Times, 04/24/98). If airlines 1 and 2 enter in a marketing alliance, markets with
ights from airline 2 can now be used by airline 1 to create new paths for indirect routes
coordination with the connecting ￿ight (especially in case of delays),and less chance of lost luggage
(source: Morrison and Winston (1995), p. 23).
7(and vice-versa). Since airline networks overlap, this changes the range of connecting
A-E customers each airline may sell seats to on a B-D ight. All else equal, the demand
from connecting A-E passengers for seats on a B-D ight should increase relative to the
demand from local B-D passengers.
2.4. Concern for Local Passengers
The policy concern is that the increase in the demand from connecting passengers may
lead to an increase in the prices for local passengers and, thus, a decrease in the number
of passengers ying nonstop.
This argument presumes the existence of negative externalities between local and
connecting passengers. While a model with increasing aircraft marginal costs per pas-
senger would allow for such externalities, the airline environment may not be so easily
characterized. Indeed, the empirical literature provides evidence of economies of density
in aircraft costs on a market: holding ight frequency constant, higher passenger vol-
umes on a market accommodated through large aircraft or denser seat congurations,
lower aircraft costs per passenger (Christensen, Caves, & Threteway (1984), Brueckner
& Spiller (1991), Berry, Carnall & Spiller (1996)).
2.5. Literature review: A Capacity Story
In an empirical analysis of hub airports, Bamberger and Carlton (1993) provide a basis
for negative externalities among local and connecting customers. They formulate a
setting with customer heterogeneity, capacity constraints and demand uncertainty. In
short, local and connecting customers di¤er in their willingness to pay for a seat on a
ight and in the time at which they are expected to join the demand for seats on ights.
There is uncertainty in the number of each type of customers. For a given seat capacity,
an exogenous increase in the expected demand from connecting passengers, some of
whom have high willingness to pay for a seat, would, under appropriate conditions,
decrease the likelihood that airlines sell a given seat to a local passenger. This would
8decrease the expected number of seats allocated to local passengers and increase their
expected ticket fare4.
Empirically, Bamberger and Carlton regress the average ticket prices for local B-D
passengers on the ight frequency on market B-D, the percentage of all B-D passengers
which are connecting passengers, and a number of descriptive market variables. They
nd that local fares are higher on markets where a higher percentage of all passengers
are connecting.
There are several problems with such a capacity-based/seat allocation story. Theoret-
ically, these models are dynamic ones given new information on bookings for a particular
ight becomes available over time. Their formulation and resolution require stringent
assumptions on how information is revealed over time and on how the endogenous vari-
ables may be updated in light of the new information. As Bamberger and Carlton note,
airlines (and their yield management groups) struggle mightily to solve this seat allo-
cation problem despite making considerable simplifying assumptions. Empirically, the
necessary data to develop this story into a structural empirical framework are not avail-
able. Namely, data on seat allocations per customer type, selling dates for tickets, and
individual load factors for particular ights are not publicly available.
2.6. Flight Frequency Valuation
The airline environment is further complicated by the presence of positive externalities
between local and connecting passengers. Airline customers desired departure times
are distributed on the 24-hr clock and there are only a small, discrete number of ights
(or indirect routes) scheduled on a market. This means that customers su¤er a time
di¤erence between their desired departure time and their actual departure time given
the schedule. Customers are said to incur a cost of frequency delay. Given aircraft have
limited seat capacity, an increase in the passenger volume on a market must, at some
point, be met with additional ights. As an airline adds ights to a market, Richard
4Dana (?) provide a similar analysis (check reference).
9(1999) shows that it spreads its departures over daytime hours. This decreases (non-
linearly, in standard spatial games à la Hotelling5) the distance between a customers
actual and desired departure times and reduces the cost of frequency delay to customers.
In the context of the paper, an increase in the number of connecting passengers on a
market may increase the number of ights on that market and this, in turn, reduces the
cost of delay to local passengers. The number of local passengers on the market may
increase.
There is ample casual and empirical evidence that such positive externalities exist.
Morrison and Winston (1995)s comprehensive analysis of airline behavior and traveler
welfare shows that passengers value increases in ight frequency. Bamberger and Carlton
also extend their analysis to document empirically (with regression work similar to that
outlined above) that, albeit fares for local passengers have risen on markets with hub
airports, the number of ights on these markets has increased, in reponse to a rise in
the number of connecting passengers at hub airports, and this has lead to an increase
in the number of local passengers despite the fare hike.
2.7. Full Price Specication
This discussion leads me to characterize the airline environment with a full price model.
In this model, customers value not the ticket price but the full price of a seat on a ight.
Formally, the full price of a seat on a ight is dened as the sum of the ticket price
charged by the airline and the cost of delay of ying on the airline on that market.
The cost of delay function is dened as the sum of the cost of frequency delay (see
earlier discussion) and the cost of stochastic delay. Frequency delay assigns a dollar value
to the di¤erence, in minutes, between a customers desired departure time and his/her
actual departure time given the schedule. It is, in this paper, a monotonic, decreasing
function of the number of ights the airline o¤ers on the market.
5For example, consider a spatial model ￿ la Hotelling where customers are uniformly distributed on
the [0,1] line segment. Assume that there is only one ￿rm and that it covers the market with 1 ￿ight. If
the ￿rm locates optimaly n outlets, a customer must at most travel a distance of 1/(n+1) to purchase
from an outlet.
10Customers desired departure times are distributed on the 24hr-clock and, as an
airline adds ights to a market, Richard (1999) shows that it spreads its departures over
daytime hours. In standard spatial games à la Hotelling, we may expect this to yield a
non-linear decrease in the distance between a customers actual and desired departure
times6.
Stochastic delay assigns a dollar value to airline-specic delays which result whenever
the passenger encounters longer than usual check-in lines, plane boarding/exiting times,
and longer baggage retrieval times. It is a function of the identity of an airline, its
passenger volume and its number of ights on the market. In that sense, stochastic delay
introduces a measure of di¤erentiation among airlines with ights. Since passengers
are known to dislike high passenger volumes on aircraft and crowded gate facilities7,
this function is monotonically increasing in the passenger volume, thereby introducing
negative externalities into the model.
The basic premise of this full price specication is that all customers agree that a
lower passenger volume and a higher ight frequency is better. The only loss of generality
comes from all customers transforming, on a per-airline basis, these attributes into dollar
values in precisely the same way. The stochastic and frequency delay functions may
themselves be redened as proxies for service quality where service quality increases as
the cost of delay decreases. These concepts of frequency and stochastic delays (and their
denition) date back to Douglas and Miller (1972), and full price specications have
long been a part of the theoretical airline literature (Dorman (1976), Panzar (1979),
Berechman and Shy (1993), Lederer (1993)). This paper is the rst, to the best of my
6For example, consider a spatial model ￿ la Hotelling where customers are uniformly distributed on
the [0,1] line segment. Assume that there is only one ￿rm and that it covers the market with 1 ￿ight. If
the ￿rm locates optimaly n outlets, a customer must at most travel a distance of 1/(n+1) to purchase
from an outlet.
7A review of recent Congressional inquiries into passenger welfare easily attest to this. On an
anecdotal level, Pieter Bouw, managing director and 22-year veteran of KLM Airlines, writes: ￿most
signi￿cant is that overcrowded terminals, runway congestion, substantial delays, and missed connections
result in a loss of service to customers. Just think about missed business meetings and frustrated
holidays; less comfort and more uncertainty; and longer transfer times and lost baggage as a result of
missed connections. The most important implication is that passengers are avoiding the airline system.￿
[Airline Business, June 1989].
11knowledge, to empirically estimate such a specication.
2.8. The Model
The model is dened for a market B-D and built to analyze the ight frequency and
quantity decisions of airlines with ights (i.e., airlines which o¤er a strictly positive
number of ights) on market B-D. The entry decisions of these airlines on market B-D
are, at this point, taken as a given. Entry is discussed, later on, when talking about the
estimation methodology. The setting is one of perfect information and the number and
identity of airlines with ights on market B-D are, thus, known to all.
In the model, K entrants (airlines with ights) on market B-D simultaneously select
their ight frequency and number of local B-D and connecting A-E passengers. Fre-
quency and quantity decisions are chosen to be simultaneous given aircraft schedules
remain rather exible once published. Flights can be added or cancelled and the cost of
doing so, while not necessarily low, is not prohibitive.
There are three levels to the economic environment on market B-D: [1] competition
for local B-D passengers among airlines with ights on market B-D; [2] competition for
B-D passengers among airlines with ights and airlines with indirect routes on market B-
D; [3] competition for connecting Ai-Ej passengers among airline with ights on market
B-D.
Let me start with describing the competitive setting in [1]. The K entrants face
one aggregated market demand from local B-D passengers. These passengers value
the full price of a seat on a B-D ight and are assumed to have identical and rational
expectations; that is, their expectations are fullled in equilibrium (re: Katz and Shapiro
(1985)). They purchase from the airline with lowest full price and, in equilibrium, ticket
prices adjust across the K airlines to yield full price equality:













































fork 6= hk ; h =1 ;:::;K
where the subscripts k;h identify the airlines and the superscripts l;c;i identify, respec-
tively, a variable for local B-D, connecting A-E and connecting B-D passengers. Namely,
pl
k denotes airline ks ticket price for local B-D passengers, fk is the number of ights for
airline k on market B-D, ql
k is the number of local passengers carried by airline k, qc
k is
the number of connecting Ai-Ej passengers carried by airline k, and qi is the number of
connecting B-D passengers carried by airlines with indirect routes on market B-D. The
term exog stands for exogenous market characteristics.
The specication allows for ights and indirect routes on market B-D to be imperfect
substitutes. On a travel time basis, Richard (1999) reports that the median length of a
ight is, in July 1993, 70 minutes (average is 87 minutes) while the median length of an
indirect route is 314 minutes (with layovers; this statistics covers indirect routes with
one and two stops).
Turning now to the competitive settings in [2] and [3], these present a formidable
obstacle. When it comes to connecting passengers and indirect routes, the competitive
environments for all markets which are part of an indirect route come into play. To carry
ac o n n e c t i n gA - Ep a s s e n g e ro na i g h to nm a r k e tB - Dr e q u i r e sc a r r y i n gt h i sp a s s e n g e ro n
all other ights of her indirect A-E route. Hence, the decision to carry this passenger has
to be made globally across all markets this passenger will travel through. However, the
operations research literature on the airline industry clearly documents that the sheer
size of airline networks and heterogeneity across airline markets prohibit any analysis of
global decision-making across markets.
Reiss and Spiller (1989) is, to my knowledge, the only paper to attempt to model
13the strategic interactions between airlines with ights and airlines with indirect routes
on a market (i.e., setting [2]). They consider the decision of a single airline to o¤er
ights on a market when it is faced with competition from airlines with indirect routes
on that market. From a model with di¤erentiated products, they nd that Cournot
conjectures best characterize the competitive setting between the airline with ight(s)
and its indirect competitors.
I propose turn to the data to examine whether any simplifying assumptions may be
given some basis for.
3. The Data
The data are from the third quarter of 1993 and are compiled from ve databases2.
Databank 1A, a database from the Department of Transportation (DOT), is a 10%
random sample of all airline tickets sold each yearly quarter. It provides, for this analysis,
the local and connecting ticket prices (with fare class) per airline and the ratio of local
to connecting passengers per airline, per market. The data do not include information
on the time-of-day or day of travel, on possible ticket restrictions, or on frequent yer
status. Databank DS T-100, another DOT database, provides the total number of
passengers and ights per route, per month. Only the major U.S. airlines and their
(directly-owned) subsidiaries (e.g., shuttle, commuter airlines) are required to report to
Databank T-100. The O¢cial Airline Guide North American editions provide a complete
listing of all scheduled ight operations for the summer of 1993. Routes with nonstop
ight operations not reported to Databank T-100 are deleted since I have no passenger
totals for these routes. The data in Databank T-100 identify the type of aircraft own on
a route. The Aircraft Quarterly Operating Costs and Statistics periodical, an AVMARK
Inc. publication which summarizes Form 41 data, details operating costs per aircraft
type, per airline. I reconcile both databases to create airline cost variables. The Census
data provide the data on market demographics and characteristics. All necessary details
on the construction of the sample data are provided in appendix A.
14The available data limit the scope of my analysis in several ways. First, since Data-
bank 1A is on a quarterly basis, all decision variables (e.g., ight frequency, quantities)
are dened on a quarterly basis. This paper can therefore be characterized as an analy-
sis of expected quarterly ight frequency and passenger volumes. Second, while airlines
report to Databank 1A the fare classes for tickets, the data on rst-class ticket prices are
notoriously unreliable. I limit the analysis to coach/economy class passenger volumes3.
Third, only nine percent of airline markets have three or more airlines with ights. To
anticipate, incorporating these markets in the estimation phase of the paper consider-
ably burdens the empirical structure while it adds few observations. I proceed to limit
the scope of the empirical analysis to markets with at most two airlines with ights.
Fourth, sample markets are directional and only one direction per market is included in
the sample data. This yields a sample of 605 markets with a single airline with ights
and 185 markets with two airlines with ights.
4. The Empirical Model
This section describes the functional forms for the model and provides an empirical
framework for cross-market strategic interactions. Three important remarks are war-
ranted. First, the nature of the model requires parametric specications for the func-
tional forms. Second, I select simple functional forms (i.e., linear, log-linear specica-
tions) which are commonly found throughout the empirical literature at-large. Third, the
empirical framework in this paper is exible on the choice of functional forms. Results
have shown much robustness, across trial estimation runs, to changes in the specica-
tions.
154.1. The Local B-D Demand
Let there be K airlines with ights on market B-D. The inverse demand function for
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8 k;h =1 ;::;K
exog
d = ¯0 + ¯1 ln(POP)+¯2POPSQK+ ¯3INC + ¯4MILES+ u1
where, to recall, pl
k is airline ks ticket price for local passengers, fk is the number of
ights for airline k on market B-D, ql
k is the number of local passengers carried by
airline k, qc
k is the number of connecting A-E passengers carried by airline k, and qi
is the number of connecting B-D passengers carried by airlines with indirect routes on
market B-D. Symbols ®k;°l;¯0;:::;¯4 are parameters to be estimated. The term u1
accounts for unobserved demand factors (i.e., I do not observe any of the demand and
cost functions).
The cost of delay specication is:























Frequency delay is non-linear in the ight frequency and stochastic delay is related to
the passenger volume per aircraft. To reect that higher ight frequency is nevertheless
accompanied by higher overall passenger volumes, stochastic delay is reduced less than
proportionately by increases in the number of ights.
The variables in the exogd term measure the size of the demand on market B-D.
16These variables include the mileage of the market (MILES), and the (natural log of )
average population (POP), population per square miles (POPSQK), and income level
(INC) across the cities for each of airports B and D.
4.2. Competition between Nonstop and Indirect Airlines
I now examine the data on sample markets to see whether any simplifying assumptions
on cross-market strategic interactions may be given some basis for. All of the num-
bers I discuss below are quarterly averages, unless otherwise mentioned, for the sample
markets based on observed ight schedules and ticket sales. Since the distributions for
the sample statistics are rather symmetric around their means/medians, these gures
provide representative information on the data.
Connecting A-E passengers account for 58% of an airlines passenger volume on a
sample market B-D. The airline draws connecting A-E passengers from 57 indirect routes
with one intermediate stop and 54 indirect routes with two stops. Indirect routes with
one stop contribute twelve times more connecting A-E passengers than indirect routes
with two stops.
Connecting passengers are rather evenly drawn from across markets A-E since each
such market contributes, on average, 1.68% (median is 0.89) of the airlines total con-
necting A-E passenger volume. Thirty percent of the markets A-E an airline draws
connecting passengers from have nonstop ights. The airline draws 28% of all of its
connecting A-E passengers from markets A-E with ights.
On a sample market B-D, 18% of all B-D passengers travel on an indirect B-D
route rather than a B-D ight. There are 6 airlines (i.e., indirect B-D airlines) carrying
passengers across a total of 18 di¤erent indirect routes. The median herndal index of
concentration in connecting B-D passengers across these airlines is 0.34 (mean is 0.39).
In other words, out of an average of 6 airlines carrying connecting B-D passengers, there
are about 2.94 (= 1/herndal = 1/0.34) e¤ective competitors. Given 91% of markets
with ights have two or fewer airlines with ights, this represents, by airline standards,
a fair amount of competition.
17In addition, an indirect B-D airline with multiple indirect B-D route carries the bulk
of its connecting B-D passengers across two indirect routes. To the extent a market has
about K e¤ective competitors per market, this means that connecting B-D passengers
spread, on average, across 6 indirect B-D routes. In fact, the number of indirect B-D
routes is more highly correlated with the number of connecting B-D passengers than the
number of airlines with indirect B-D routes (correlation of 0.63 vs. 0.55). There is also
some issue as to how much coordination there is for a given airline across its indirect
routes on a market. A substantial amount of coordination demands a global approach
decision-making and we are back to the basic problem, which motivates this dicussion,
of how to model such a setting.
For markets with no ights (i.e., in the data at large), there are 2 airlines o¤ering a
total of 3.5 indirect routes. The number of e¤ective competitors (in terms of passenger
volume) is 1.3 on these markets. The total passenger volume on markets with no ights
is eleven time smaller on average than that on market with ights.
It is clear from this statistical summary that the data provide no denite answers as
to how to model cross-market strategic interactions. Nevertheless, a few traits can be
highlighted. First, airlines carry connecting passengers from a large number of markets
and passengers from each of these markets represent a very small percentage of the
airlines total passenger volume on market B-D (i.e., 1.68% of 58% = 0.97%). Second,
there are a fair, by airline standards, number of airlines with indirect routes on a sample
market and connecting B-D passengers are carried across a large number of di¤erent
indirect B-D routes.
In light of these statistics, I specify a revenue schedule specication for connecting
A-E passengers. This schedule provides the number of connecting A-E passengers an
airline may carry for a given full price. Namely, an airline with ights on market B-
D is assumed to act as a price-taker with regards to its connecting A-E demand. In
the model, the airline selects the average ticket price for its connecting A-E passengers,
where this average price is computed across all observed prices for the entire itinerary
(i.e., across all ights on the indirect routes) of all of its connecting A-E passengers on
18market B-D in the third quarter of 1993.
Connecting A-E passengers value the full-price of a seat on a B-D ight with airline
k. The full price for a connecting passenger is dened as the sum of the ticket price and
the cost of delay associated with airline k. The specication is:



































DUMk proxies for the cost of delay on the non B-D ight(s) of the indirect route
where pc
k is the average ticket price paid by a connecting passenger for her entire itinerary
(i.e., across all ights on her indirect route), and °c;® k;±5k are parameters to be esti-
mated.
The frequency delay valuation parameter °c is allowed to di¤er across the specica-
tions for local and connecting passengers. A ight on market B-D is only one ight on
a connecting passengers indirect route and this passenger should, thus, be expected to
value it di¤erently than a local passenger. The stochastic delay specication for ight
B-D is assumed identical across both local and connecting passengers; this assumption
is made to simplify the structure of the estimated models. Finally, given the aggregated
nature of the analysis, the cost of delay on the non B-D ight(s) of a passengers indi-
rect route may not be accounted for and I proxy for it with an airlines specic dummy
variable.
The revenue schedule for connecting A-E demand for airline k on market B-D is























k = ±0 + ±1 ln(ROUTk)+±2RMILESk + ±3HUBk + ±4 ln(MILES)+u2k
where ±;±0;:::;±4 are parameters to be estimated, and u2k accounts for unobserved fac-
tors.
Characteristics for airline k on market B-D are the number of potential indirect
routes including ight B-D (ROUTk) and the average of the ratio of the mileage of
each potential indirect route to the shortest mileage itinerary available for that market
(RMILESk). These variables are based upon indirect routes constructed, by appending
markets with ights, from the same airline, to one another (irrespective of ight times)
given entry decisions across non B-D markets (see appendix B for ampler details). The
variable HUBk is a dummy variable denoting the presence of a hub for airline k at
airports B and/or D8. I expect the presence of a hub for airline k on the B-D market to
increase the demand from connecting passengers for seats on a B-D ight.
4.2.1. The Reaction Function for Connecting B-D Passengers on Market B-D
Each indirect airline on market B-D decides upon the number of connecting B-D passen-
gers it carries within the context of its quantity and frequency decisions on the markets
which make up its indirect route(s). As documented in the previous sub-section, con-
necting B-D passengers make up only a very small fraction of the airlines total passenger
volume on these markets. Given the assumed empirical framework for connecting A-E
passengers, I treat the airlines with indirect routes as a price-taking competitive fringe
and specify a reaction function for the total number of connecting B-D passengers. This
8These airports are designated as hub airports for the third quarter of 1993: [1] Minneapolis-St Paul,
Detroit DTW, Memphis for Northwest; [2] Atlanta, Salt Lake City, Cincinnati, Dallas-Fort Worth
for Delta; [3] Chicago O￿Hare, Denver, LAX, San Francisco SFO, Washington IAD for United; [4]
Pittsburgh, Charlotte, Baltimore BWI, Philadelphia for USAir; [5] Dallas-Fort Worth, Chicago O￿Hare,
Miami, Nashville, Raleigh-Durham for American; [6] St Louis for TWA; [7] Houston IAH, Newark,
Cleveland, Denver for Continental; [8] Phoenix for America West.
Only 10% of sample markets do not have a hub airline with ￿ights.



















i = ¸0 + ¸1AREA + ¸2ICON + ¸3 ln(MILES)+¸4IRATE+ u3
where ¸;¸0;:::;¸4 are parameters, u3 is an error term, and qi is the total number of
connecting B-D passengers for market B-D. These passengers travel on indirect routes
from airport B to airport D.
Variables for market B-D include the square miles area for the cities including airports
Ba n dD( AREA; i.e., a demand variable), the number of potential indirect routes on
market B-D (ICON), the ratio of their average mileage to the mileage of market B-D
(IRATE).
4.2.2. Cost Functions
The Aircraft Quarterly Operating Costs and Statistics periodicals contain airline cost
data, for the rst quarter of 1993, on a per hour of utilization, per aircraft type, per
airline basis. The data in Databank T-100 provides the type of aircraft utilized on a
market at that time. I combine the information from both databases to construct airline
cost variables for the sample markets (which are third quarter data). These variables
help specify the cost functions of the model and are instrumental in its identication.
The variables were assigned to the various cost functions on the basis of regression work
(not documented).
Conceptually, airline costs on market B-D can be dened as a function of the number
of ights and number of passengers on market B-D:
airline costs(#o f i g h t s ,#o fp a s s e n g e r s )=cost(# of passengers)
+[ # of ights] £ [cost per ight(# of passengers per ight, cost variables)]
21For the purpose of this paper, I write



















































k represent linear combinations of cost char-
acteristics for airline k.
The hub-and-spoke structure of airline networks is a dening characteristic of this
industry and there is empirical evidence in the literature that hub airports raise the
hub airlines yields and ticket prices for local passengers (Borenstein (1989), General
Accounting O¢ce (1988-1998), Morrison & Winston (1995)). In particular, the system
of bank scheduling at hub airports (i.e., ight arrivals and departures are concentrated
at given time periods) has been argued to promote ine¢cient usage of airport facilities
and aircraft resources9. This would raise ight frequency and passenger costs at the hub
airports.
Each of the cost specications in the paper includes two hub variables: HUBk,w h i c h
is airline-specic, and MAJHUB. This latter variable denotes whether each of airports
B and/ D are one of the major US hubs (e.g., Atlanta, Dallas Forth-Worth, Houston
IAH, Los Angeles LAX, Miami, New York JFK, and Chicago OHare).
The contribution to the literature is that, within a structural framework with endoge-
nous decision-making, I identify, and provide measures for, the impact of hub airports
on the ight frequency, local and connecting ticket prices. The analysis is from a cost-
based perspective albeit, it must be said, the use of dummy variables to account for
9In 1994, the C.E.O. of Continental Lite (a former point-to-point subsidiary of Continental Airlines)
explains that ￿CO Lite wants 9.5 gate turns per day [only 4 gate turns per day at CO￿s hubs], 11.3
hours of aircraft utilization, and 6 hours ￿hard ￿ying￿ per crew-member. These are the things that drive
costs. Although Denver [a CO hub] and Greensboro [not a CO hub] have roughly the same number of
￿ights per day, because of the way the banks run at Denver, we￿ve got to have 20 gates manned between
1pm and 2pm. Greensboro only has six gates and they are always manned.￿ [Air Transport World,
June 1994].
22hub airports does not prevent some type of xed (i.e., independent of quantity levels)
markup interpretation10. For example, Borenstein (1989) argues that factors such as fre-
quent yer programs, close ties to travel agencies, greater advertising exposure, provide
comparative advantages to hub airlines at their hub airports.
For the marginal cost per ight, I have:
cost
f
k =e x p ( ·0 + ·1FUELk + ·2CASMk + ·3HUBk + ·4MAJHUB
+·5SLOT + ·6 ln(MILES)+·7DLk + u4k)
where u4k accounts for unobserved factors and ·0;...,·6 are parameters to be estimated.
The airline-specic cost variables are aircraft fuel costs (FUEL k) and operating costs
per available seat-mile (CASMk). This latter variable is a standard measure of costs
in the literature. The variable SLOT is a dummy denoting the presence of landing
and take-o¤ lots at Chicago OHare, New York JFK and Laguardia, and Washington
National airports. The dummy variable DLk denotes whether or not airline k is Delta
Airlines. This dummy variable was added during the estimation process as it proved to
signicantly improve the t of the model.
If the specications for the costl
k and costc
k terms should conceptually share some
variables and parameters, I do not impose parameter restrictions across both speci-
cations and they include some di¤erent variables. The main reason is that the ticket
prices for connecting and local passengers are measured over di¤ering itineraries since
the ticket prices for connecting passengers apply to their entire itinerary, not just for the
ight on market B-D. Hence, I use mileage characteristics for the indirect routes rather
than market B-D in the marginal cost function for connecting passengers.
For the marginal cost per local passenger, I specify:
cost
l
k = !0 + !1 ln(CSBHk)+!2MAINTk + !3MAJHUB+ !4MILES+
10The objective of the paper is not a detailed analysis of pricing policies at hub airports. This explains
the approach I have opted for. To introduce expliclty a mark-up story would require a more complicated
demand system and a di⁄erent model.
23+!5HUBk £ MILES+ u5k
where u5k accounts for unobserved factors and !0;...,!5 are parameters to be estimated.
The airline cost variables are the (natural log of) operating costs per seat, per hour of
utilization (CSBHk) and aircraft maintenance costs (MAINTk). Costs may possibly
di¤er at hub airports and I include two hub variable, MAJHUB and an airline-specic
interaction variable, HUBk £MILES11. Mileage is one of the primary determinants of
airline costs and an interaction variable o¤ers, here, more interest at the interpretation
level than a simple dummy (note that it also yields a better t).
For the marginal cost per connecting passenger, I have:
cost
c
1 = Ã0 + Ã1TOTMILk + Ã2 ln(CSBHk)+Ã3MAJHUB+ Ã4HUBk + u6k
where u6k accounts for unobserved factors and Ã0;...,Ã4 are parameters to be estimated.
The TOTMILk variable denotes the average total mileage for all potential indirect
routes from airline k which include ight B-D. In this specication, a dummy variable
for hub e¤ects, HUBk, proves a better t than an interaction variable.
4.2.3. Prot-Maximization Problem: Market with one Nonstop Airline
Given these choices of functional forms, a single airline (e.g., airline 1) on a market B-D































































11I recognize, however, that some of the value of the estimated parameter a5 could be attributed to


















There are three equations to the demand system: equations M.1 to M.3.
4.2.4. Prot-Maximization Problem: Market with two Nonstop Airlines





































































































































There are ve equations to the demand system: equations D.1 to D.5 (i.e., equation D.3
for k=1 and equation D.4 for k=2).
4.2.5. First-order Conditions










































































There are three rst-order conditions for a market with one airline: equations M.4 to M.6
with k =1. There are six rst-order conditions for a market with two airlines: equations
D.6, D.8 and D.10 for k =1 , equations D.7, D.9 and D.11 for k =2 :
4.3. Estimated Systems of Equations
Equations M.1 to M.6 determine optimal ight frequency and quantity choices for a
single airline with ights on market B-D. These equations represent the estimated system









denotes the variables endogenous to the system for a sample
market j with one airline (i.e., superscript m for monopoly in (nonstop) ights), xm
j
stands for the vector of exogenous variables, and the vector of residuals for the system







j ;N j =0 ;µ
¢
=( u1;u 2;u 3;u 4;u 5;u 6)
where Nj is a dummy denoting the presence of a second airline with ight on market j
and µ is the vector of parameters.
Equations D.1 to D.11 determine (Nash) equilibrium frequency and quantity choices
for two airlines with ights on market B-D. Ticket prices are constructed from Databank
1A which is a 10% random sample of airline tickets and equation D.2, which denotes
full price equality for local passengers on market B-D, does not hold, as such, for sample
























Equations D.1, D.2*, D.3 to D.11 form the estimated system of equations for sample mar-












denotes the variables endogenous to the system for a sample market j with two airlines
(i.e., superscript d for duopoly), xd
j stands for the vector of exogenous variables, and the







j;N j =1 ;µ
¢
=( u1;u 21;u 22;u 3;u 41;u 42;u 51;u 52;u 61;u 62;u 7)
Some additional comments... First, all residual terms are assumed to have mean
zero. This is the only distributional assumption on the residual terms. Second, with the
exception of stochastic delay parameters ®k and ±5k; parameter values for the model do
not vary with the number and identity of the airlines with ights on a market. Namely,
I estimate only one of each demand and cost functions for the whole model. For the
parameter ®k; I experimented with creating groups of airlines and assigning a parameter
to each group. I found little variation in estimated parameter values except with regards
to Delta and American Airlines (see discussion later in the results). The estimated model
thus includes 2 di¤erent ®k parameters: one for Delta and American Airlines, one for all
other airlines. Finally, the variable DUMk in the full price specication for connecting
passengers represents a single dummy variable for Delta Airlines12.
4.4. Marketing Alliances
4.4.1. Data
The data for the analysis of alliances is built to represent an industry with alliances be-
tween each of Continental and Northwest, American and US Airways, Delta and United.
These alliances change the network characteristics of these airlines. The specications
contain ve variables denoting network characteristics: ROUTk and RMILESk in the
connecting A-E schedule, ICON and IRATE in the function for connecting B-D pas-
sengers, and TOTMILk in the marginal cost for a connecting A-E passenger.
12Ad u m m yf o rA m erican Airlines was initially added, then dropped (for parsimony) since its esti-
mated parameter value was found not to di⁄er signi￿cantly (at 10%) from zero.
27For estimation purposes, these variables are constructed, for airline k, from airline
ks entry decisions across markets other than B-D. Markets with ights from airline k
are appended to one another (irrespective of ight times) given airline ks entry decisions
across non B-D markets13. This yields a data of potential indirect routes per airline per
market. When simulating an alliance between airlines k and h, I add to these data for
airline k, those potential indirect routes constructed from both airline k and airline hs
entry decisions across markets other than B-D.
In the third quarter of 1993, 95% of markets have four or fewer potential indirect
routes per airline. The Databank 1A data, which contain tickets sold to passengers,
indicate that an airline carried its connecting passengers for a market through four or
fewer indirect routes 98.8% of the time. In an industry with alliances, 95% of markets
now have twelve or fewer potential indirect routes per airline. Namely, alliances provide
greater exibility to an airline in its routing of connecting passengers for a market. They
also provide a greater array of possible departure times to connecting passengers and
increase the relative attractiveness of indirect B-D routes to a ight on market B-D.
To capture this increase in exibility in an industry with alliance while maintining
some bound on the number of potential indirect routes, I limit the number of indirect
routes per airline per market to the eight indirect routes with shortest mileage14.T h i s
applies to the construction of the data for potential indirect routes for both the estima-
tion and the alliance samples. Note that the identity of the eight shortest indirect routes
for an airline on a market may di¤er across both samples. In an industry with alliances,
shorter potential paths (for indirect routes) become available on some markets; this can
decrease the number of connecting A-E markets for an airline on some markets.
In the sample data for alliances, the number of connecting A-E markets, ROUTk,
changes (with regards to the sample values used for the estimation) for 890 of the 975
13I do not consider any indirect routes for a market with mileage 3.5 times greater than the mileage
of a ￿ight, if there is one, or of the shortest indirect route, if there are no ￿ights on the market.
14In an industry with alliances, 91% of sample markets have 8 or fewer indirect routes. Note that,
without this limit, the number of potential indirect routes is very large number of potential indirect
routes for some markets (up to 100). It is a fact that airlines do not route connecting passengers for a
market through tens of itineraries.
28airline observations in the sample (i.e., 605 markets with 1 airline, 185 markets with 2
airlines). The average increase in ROUTk is 64, while the average increase in ln(ROUTk)
is 0.87. In 13 of these 890 instances, the value of ROUTk decreases. Meanwhile, the
number of indirect routes per sample market, ICON, increases, on average, by 5.9715.
In summary, upon estimation of the model, I modify the data for the sample markets
to reect an airline environment with marketing alliances. This changes the sample
values for the variables ROUTk, RMILESk, ICON, IRATE,a n dTOTMILk.T h i s
updated sample denes the alliance sample data.
4.4.2. Comparative Statics
When airline k enters into an alliance, the values of the exogc
k, costc
k and exogi terms in
the system of equations determining its optimal/equilibrium decisions (either equations
M.1-M.6 or D.1-D.11) change. These changes impact on airline ks ight frequency and
quantity decisions. Some intuition may be provided.
Let airline ks demand from connecting A-E passengers increases as a result of the
alliances. Since the marginal cost of a passenger is lower than that of a ight, an
increase in the number of connecting passengers increases more than proportionately the
airlines passenger volume relative to its ight frequency. This raises the cost of stochastic
delay and, in turn, raises local ticket prices (equations M.4, D.6-D.7). Nevertheless, the
marginal increase in the ight frequency may su¢ciently decrease the overall cost of
delay that full prices for local passengers fall. Hence, the number of local B-D passenges
may rise in an industry with alliances.
Having said this, the price for local B-D passengers need not even rise. Alliances
increase the number of indirect routes on a market B-D. This increases the number of
B-D passengers which travel on indirect routes and puts downward pressure on the price
for local B-D passengers.
The contribution of this paper is that it accounts for all these e¤ects and endogenously
15Two identical indirect routes for market B-D which are code-shared across two airlines within an
alliance count only as one indirect route.
29estimates all relevant parameters to the model. The framework further provides the
expected changes in frequency, quantity, and ticket prices for markets with alliances.
5. Estimation
5.1. GMM Estimation
The systems of equations M.1-M.6 and D.1-D.11 are estimated with a Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) method (re: Gallant (1986)). Instrumental variables for
non-linear systems commonly include the variables exogenous to the model and lower
order monomials thereof. I make no attempt to nd the most e¢cient set of instruments
and use for instruments (almost all of16) the variables exogenous to the model. For a
listing, see table 1.
Table 1. Listing of Instrumental variables for the GMM estimation of the models
ln(POP) AREA INC POPSQK MILES
ln(ROUTk) RMILESk SLOT HUBk MAJHUB
CASMk FUELk ln(CSBHk) MAINTk ICON IRATE
Note: There are 16 instumental variables for the system for 1 airline and 23 for the system with 2 airlines
5.2. Sample Selection Bias
I have specied the (variable) prot-maximization model for a given number of airlines
with ights on a market. Sample selection bias is a possibility; that is, the unobserved
factors in the prot-maximization model may be correlated with unobserved factors
determining the number of airlines on the market. If this correlation is not dealt with
when estimating the model, estimated parameter values will be biased.
While a structural model of entry is desirable, it is not applicable to this analysis.
Two econometric issues would have to be resolved. First, variable prots are a non-
16Variables ln(MILES) and TOTMILk are not included in the lists of instrumental variables due to
high correlation with the variable MILES. To provide a measure of the collinearity among instrumental
variables, the ratio of the highest to the lowest eigenvalue to the instrumental vaiable matrix is 101 for
markets with 1 airline and 263 for markets with 2 airlines.
30trivial function of airline characteristics. Depending upon the identities of the entrants,
it is conceivable that the same market could contain di¤erent number of rms. This
non-uniqueness of entry equilibria is a major obstacle to any empirical estimation of
entry17. Second, variable prots are a non-linear function of the residual terms (in each
of systems M.1-M.6 and D.1-D.11). This makes it essentially impossible to relate the
distributions of unobserved factors across the entry conditions and prot-maximization
models. On a related data problem, the data for rst-class passengers are known to be
unreliable in the early 1990s. First-class passengers, as previously mentioned, are not
dealt with in this paper and their revenues may account for a fair portion of market
revenues depending upon the market and the time of the year.
5.3. Correcting for Sample Selection Bias
To deal with the possibility of a sample selection bias, I proceed to characterize the
prot-maximization model as a marginal model. This means that, unconditionally on
actual entry choices, the model describes the optimal choices for the decision variables
(i.e., frequency, quantities) on a market with one or two airlines of given characteristics.
For a market j; the model is then said to produce the notional output vector ym
j (dened
earlier) when there is one airline and yd
j when there are two airlines. Note that, implicitly,
any structural model of entry would, as I believe airlines do in practice, compare among
such notional values.
Given this interpretation of the models, any possible sample selection bias may be
corrected for by appropriately weighting the moment conditions used to estimate the


















denote the instrumental variables, with zm
j as the vector of instrumental variables for a
market j with one airline and zd
j that for a market j with two airlines. The theoretical
moment conditions for market j can be written as:
17For example, Berry (1992) assumes that variable pro￿ts depend only on the number of airlines in
the market, not their identity or characteristics. Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) allow for ￿rm-speci￿c
unobservables in variable pro￿ts but limit their analysis to two potential entrants. As Berry (1992)
points out (and deals with), there are a large number of potential entrants in the airline industry.
31m(yj;x j;N j;µ
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o is the vector of true parameter values for the model. These weighted moment
conditions yield consistent estimated parameter values since










j ;N j =0 ;µ
o¢











j;N j =1 ;µ
o¢











j ;N j =0 ;µ
o¢











j;N j =1 ;µ
o¢












j ;N j =0 ;µ
o¢











j;N j =1 ;µ
o¢






























=0 (by denition of the parameters of interest)
In practice, I only observe, for a market j; one of ym
j or yd
j: Hence, the GMM method,
as I have outlined it, is not applicable without a working assumption. The model
produces the frequency, quantities, and prices for an airline both when it is the only
airline with ights on a market and when it faces a competitor with ights on a market.
32I dene an aggregated vector y⁄





















































when there are two airlines with ights.
With regards to the exogenous variables, I only observe the characteristics of the entrants
on market j. For airlines not on market j, I can construct the network variables but not
the cost variables18. This leads me to dene an aggregated vector x⁄
j of exogenous
variables for market t. This vector includes:
[1] all variables for market B-D which do not depend upon the identity of the air-
line(s). These variables are MILES, ln(MILES), ln(POP), AREA, INC, POPSQK,
MAJHUB, SLOT, ICON, IRATE);
[2] network characteristics for airlines with ights on market B-D and, for markets
when there is only one airline, the network characteristics for the airline with highest
value for ln(ROUT) which has no ights on market B-D (i.e., a most likely entrant).
These variables are ln(ROUTk);RMILES k;HUB k;
[3] the cost characteristics of the airline on market B-D when it is the only one
with ights, and the average cost characteristics across both airlines on market B-D
in duopoly settings. These variables are CASM, FUEL, MAINT, ln(CSBH),a n d
TOTMIL;19
[4] variables which may impact on entry on market B-D in the third quarter of
1993 but are not part of the model of prot-maximization. These variables include the
18I constructed cost variables for airlines not on market j from the aircraft assignment information on
markets of similar mileage. These variables proved to have di⁄erent means from the ones constructed
for airline with ￿ights on market j. This meant that, in the probit estimation I￿ll shortly characterize,
these were highly signi￿cant variables. Given the arbitrary nature of the method used to construct
these variables, I felt it was more appropriate to discard them.
19I could have included a TOTMIL variable for a second airline (as with the other network charac-
teristics in [2]); I did not do so for the speci￿c estimation run I discuss in this paper.
33average herndal index of concentration in ight departures at airports B and D for
the rst quarter of 1993 (HFL), the number of airlines with hubs at airports B and D
(HUBAIR), and the number of airports within each of the cities which airports B and
Db e l o n gt o( AIRP) (see appendix D for a complete listing of the variables in x⁄).
For the weighted GMM method to yield consistent parameter values, I impose the
working assumption that:





This is an implicit conditional independence assumption20: conditionally on the contents
of y⁄
j and x⁄
j; nothing more is learned on the presence of a second airline with ights on
market B-D from the remaining information contained in yj and xj:
The entry probabilities, Pr(Nj = n j y⁄
j;x ⁄
j) for n =0 ;1, are estimated with a
standard probit regression. Predicted probability values, \ Pr(Nj = n j y⁄
j;x ⁄
j) for n =0 ;1;
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¢
, pm
j = \ Pr(Nj =0j y⁄
j;x ⁄
j),a n dpd
j = \ Pr(Nj =1j y⁄
j;x ⁄
j):
20I feel reasonably comfortable with this assumption. I feel particularly comfortable with it when I
consider the assumptions an alternate method of dealing with entry would have demanded.
34The rst-stage nds a preliminary estimate b µ of µ
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h = m;d (markets with 1,2 airline(s))
where In is a n £ n identity matrix, nm and nd denote, respectively, the number of
sample markets with one and two airlines. The variance-covariance matrix V is block-
diagonal since the sample includes no markets where the number of airlines with ights
changes during the sample period.
The preliminary estimate b µ of µ
0 is consistent but not e¢cient. Greater e¢ciency,
and some protection against heteroskedasticity, is achieved by updating the variance-
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0 with µ





of these sample moment conditions, I test for heteroskedasticity in the residual terms.
The natural log of squared residual values are regressed on selected squared exogenous
variables. Given the low R2 values (all are inferior to 0.2), no additional correction is
found necessary.




















35on markets with two airlines. These predicted values are computed, by bootstrap, on the
basis of a random draw of 100 residual terms for each of the two systems of equations.
Correlation among observed and predicted values attest to the goodness of t of the
model.
For the analysis of alliances, I modify the estimation sample to create the aliance
sample (as explained earlier). Given the estimated parameter values for the model,
I simulate, by bootstrap and on the basis of the same residual draws as for earlier
predictions, the ight frequency, quantities and prices for the airline markets in the
alliance sample data. This produces updated values for output vectors ym
j on markets
with one airline and yd
j on markets with two airlines in a setting with marketing alliances.
A comparison of the prediction results across the estimation sample and the alliance
sample is the basis for the discussion of the alliance results.
6. Results
6.1. Probit results for Entry
The probit regression correctly predicts 92% of sample markets (e.g., 573 of 605 markets
with 1 airline and 151 of 185 markets with two airlines). Estimates, listed in table
3, show that the likelihood of a second airline with ights on a market increases with
the size of the market (as measured by the variables AREA and INC) and decreases
with the level of airport concentration (HFL). A second airline is also more likely to
enter on a market with one of its hub airports (variables HUB2 and SHORTHUB2).
However, the larger is the connecting A-E demand for an airline on market (as measured
by ln(ROUT1)), the lower is the likelihood that another airline enters that market.
The inclusion (in the probit) of the six aggregated output variables in vector y⁄ (e.g.,
quantities, etc.) allows me to test for the relevance of sample bias corrections. I test the
null hypothesis that Pr(N =1 jx⁄)=P r( N =1 jx⁄;y⁄);that is, entry is independent of
y⁄. Comparing the log-likelihood values for a probit regression including vector y⁄ to
one ran without it, I nd that ¡2 £ (di¤erence in log-likelihood values) =2 6 :5=Â2
6.
36This means that the null hypothesis is rejected at a 1% signicance level. The output
variables signicantly contribute to the predictive power of the probit regression.
Having said this, no signs (e.g., positive or negative) or signicance results for the
estimated parameter values are reversed if I weight the sample moment conditions by
either Pr(N =1 jx⁄) or Pr(N =1 jx⁄;y ⁄): Qualitatively, correcting for sample selection
bias changes little to the interpretation of the results.
6.2. Estimation Results for the Prot-Maximization Model
6.2.1. Cost of Delay Valuation and Full Prices
The results deliver estimates of the cost of delay to airline passengers (see table 5). The
cost of delay is the sum of the costs of stochastic and frequency delay. At sample mean
values, the cost of stochastic delay to a passenger amounts to $9.30, while the cost of
frequency delay is $86.87. The cost of delay to a local B-D passenger averages, thus, to
$96.17 across sample markets in the third quarter of 1993.
The average ticket price for a local B-D passenger is $187.09. This means that the
full price of a seat to a local passenger averages to $283.26. The cost of delay accounts
for 33.95% of the amount of this full price.
The higher cost of frequency delay relative to stochastic delay is expected. Sample
markets average 3.5 ights per day while customers desired departure times are dis-
tributed on the 24-hr clock (primarily, from 6am to 10pm). Hence, the average time
di¤erence (frequency delay) between desired and actual departure times across passen-
gers should be greater than the average stochastic delay encountered on aircraft/at
airports on the day of travel.
The results (in table 5) also provide the marginal worth to a local passenger (ying
coach) of an extra ight per day, per airline on a market. For example, if an airline
increases its number of daily ights from 2 to 3 on a market, that additional ight is
worth $18.52 to a local B-D passenger. If the increase is from 3 to 4 daily ights, that
additional ight is worth $11.04. This type of results is novel to the literature (including
37the study of airline service in Morrison and Winston (1995)).
6.2.2. Hub airports
Hub airlines have signicantly higher marginal costs per ight on markets with their
hub airport(s) (re: parameter ·3 in table 5). This is consistent with claims that hub
operations lower aircraft utlization rates and ine¢ciently use airport and gate facilities21.
The marginal cost of a ight is, however, relatively lower (re: parameter ·4) at the major
international hub airports (e.g., Atlanta, Dallas Forth-Worth, Houston IAH, Los Angeles
LAX, Miami, New York JFK, and Chicago OHare). The sheer size of airline operations
at these airports may provide some economies of scale and greater competition on fuel
and maintenance costs.
In line with a nding of higher frequency costs, hub airlines are found to charge local
passengers 1.48 cents more per mile on markets to/from their hub airports. On a market
of 850 miles (sample average), this amounts to 6.8% of the $185 sample average ticket
price for local passengers. Morrison and Winston (1995) cite a hub premium of 4 to 7%
in 1993 (p.48). Ticket prices for local passengers are, further, estimated to be $10 higher
on a market from/to one of the major hubs22.
As for connecting ticket prices, these are estimated to be $23 lower on hub airlines on
markets with their hub airport(s). This decrease may result from greater e¢ciency with
regards to handling of the connecting passengers ight transfer (e.g., greater e¢ciency
in baggage handling, greater ability to deal with delays and rebookings). However, con-
necting ticket prices are $10 higher on markets with one of the major hub airports. These
airports are major nerve centers for the industry where congestion probems through-
21It is worth noting that sample markets with a hub airport average 820 miles while markets with no
hub airports average 1007 miles. Given the bulk of aircraft costs is incurred at take-o⁄, a given aircraft
is more expensive to ￿y on a shorter route. This may be argued to account for some of the higher costs
per ￿ight on markets with hub airports (beyond what the ln(MILES) variable already accounts for).
For example, Morrison and Winston (1995, p. 46) have such an argument with regards to some hub
studies. I did experiment with an interaction HUBk £ ln(MILES) variable, instead of a hub dummy,
but found it to yield a (marginally) poorer ￿t.
22This ￿nding is a bit surprising in light of the lower relative frequency costs at these airports.
38out the system tend to accumlate. Since congestion primarily impacts on connecting
passengers, this could explain the relative increase in costs.
6.2.3. Goodness of t: Estimated Parameter values
The full price specication requires that customers assign a positive (dollar) value to
the cost of delay. The parameter values for the costs of frequency and stochastic delay,
®k, °l, °c are estimated to be positive and signicantly di¤erent from zero (see table 4).
Similarly, other estimated parameter values have signs consistent with the economic and
institutional details of the model. The inverse local B-D demand and the connecting A-E
schedule are downward sloping, while the reaction function for connecting B-D customers
is upward sloping in the full price for a local B-D passenger. The local B-D demand is
found to signicantly increase with the population of the market (variable ln(POP))a n d
the mileage of the route (MILES). The connecting A-E demand signicantly increases
with the number of potential connecting A-E markets (ln(ROUT)) while it decreases
as the ratio of the mileage of these potential indirect routes to the shortest mileage
itinerary available for that market increases (RMILESk). The number of connecting
B-D passengers increases with the number of indirect B-D routes (ICON). The mileage
of a market is also found to signicantly increase airlines marginal costs.
This is not to say that all parameter estimates necessarily meet expectations23.I n
particular, the point estimate for the slope of the indirect quantity, ¯
i,i nt h ei n v e r s el o c a l
B-D demand is higher than the point estimate for the slope for the local B-D quantity,
¯
l: However, I fail to reject the null hypothesis that ¯
i = ¯
l at a 5% signicance level24.
23For example, the variable IRATE is found to have a positive and signi￿cant impact on the number
of connecting B-D passengers. The main issue here is that the value of IRATE rises with the number
of indirect B-D routes (with the value of ICON) so that a higher value of IRATE measures, in some
sense, an increase in the number of indirect routes on market B-D.
24The point estimate for ﬂ
i has consistently been higher than the point estimate for the slope for the
local B-D quantity, ﬂ
l, across all trial runs with various functional forms and speci￿cations. This is also
the case if I run a standard OLS or two stage least-squares regression on the inverse demand function.
In addition, I experimented with writing the connecting B-D quantity as a function of only the ￿ight
frequency on market B-D or of the quantity of local B-D passengers. In neither cases, did I get a point
estimate for ﬂ
i smaller than that for ﬂ
l:
39Connecting A-E passengers are also estimated to incur a cost of delay about three times
as great as local passengers. While additional ights may signicantly reduce the time
connecting passengers may spend waiting at an airport, the magnitude of the di¤erence
in valuation is a bit surprising. It remains that while point estimates for frequency
delay for local passengers have ranged from 1200 to 1400 across estimation runs, those
for connecting passengers have varied from 3300 to 4900 depending upon the choice of
instruments and specications.
6.2.4. Goodness of t : Test and Predictions
The criterion value for the GMMs objective function is, at optimum, equal to 125 in
the rst stage and 969 in the second stage25. Gallant (1986) indicates that this value
is a Chi-square with (6 £ 16) + (11 £ 23) ¡ 44 = 305 degrees of freedom. Clearly,
the models specication is statistically rejected. Two comments are warranted. First,
as Gasmi, La¤ont & Vuong (1992) emphasize, rejection is typical for large structural
models. Second, method of moments estimation techniques are geared towards the
estimation of sample mean values. This papers endogenous variables (e.g., quantities,
etc.) happen to exhibit, across markets, substantial heterogeneity around their sample
mean values (descriptive statistics are in appendix A).
A better measure of t for the model is the correlations between observed and pre-
dicted values for the output variables in each of the ym and yd vectors. The model
predicts well the decision variables on markets with a single airline. Predicted mean
values for the ight frequency, quantities and prices are close to their observed sample
mean values. Correlations among predicted and observed values across sample markets
range from 0.62 to 0.8 (see table 6)26.
The model predicts poorly, however, the endogenous variables on markets with two
25Residuals were checked for outliers. For the estimation results presented in the paper, two percent
of sample markets (17 out of 790) are not included in the estimation sample. Their deletion from this
sample decreased the optimal value for the ￿rst-stage objective function by 30%.
26For comparison￿s sake, I ran least-square regressions for each demand and cost functions (with and
without endogenous variables on the right-hand side). Adjusted R-square values range from 0.4 to 0.7
and their magnitude mirrors closely that of the correlation values for the structural model.
40airlines. While correlation values range as well from 0.5 to 0.8, mean predicted values
di¤er substantially from mean sample values (see table 6). There are some explanations.
First, the only distributional assumptions on the residuals is that they have zero mean.
While this is appealing from an estimation point of view, it does not facilitate the
computation of predictions. Second, I estimate one set of demand and cost parameters
across sample markets. Since there are about 3.5 times fewer sample markets with two
airlines than sample markets with one airline, one expects the model to t better that
data on markets with one airline. There is also as much heterogeneity in the sample
values of the output variables across markets with two airlines as there is across markets
with one airline. Third, full price equality does not hold (as such) at sample values
across markets with two airlines. The resolution algorithm for predictions has to adjust
quantities and prices as to yield full price equality. This can yield extreme predicted
values for the quantities of local passengers.
6.3. Results for Marketing Alliances
6.3.1. Simulation Results
This discussion compares amongst predicted output values for the estimation sample
and the alliance sample. Given the models relatively low predictive power for markets
with two airlines, I base my analysis on simulated output values for the 556 sample
markets with a single airline where this airline belongs to an alliance27.
Alliances decrease the number of local B-D passengers on 82% of sample markets.
The median change is -32%. While the number of connecting B-D passengers rises on
98% of sample markets (median change, ¢; is +47%), this increase is not su¢cient to
palliate for the decrease in the number of local B-D passengers. The total passenger
volume on a market B-D decreases on 80% of sample markets with a median change of
-15%.
2749 of the 605 markets have ￿ights from an airline not in one of the three alliances. These arlines
are America West, TWA, Midwest Express, Kiwi, and Brani⁄.
41The number of connecting A-E passengers for an airline with ights on a market
B-D increases across 77% of markets (median ¢ is 14.6%), while the ticket price for
connecting A-E passengers is lower on 69% of markets and falls, on average, by 0.07%.
The total passenger volume for an airine with ights on market B-D (i.e.,both local
B-D and connecting A-E passengers) decreases on 64% of sample markets (median ¢
is -9.7%) and the airlines ight frequency on a market B-D falls, on average, by 1.5%.
Consequently, stochastic delay decreases (median ¢ is -5%), while frequency delay in-
creases (median ¢ is 4.5%), across 63% of sample markets . The cost of delay is higher
on 74% of sample routes.
The end result is that, on the average, the ticket price for local B-D passengers falls
by 2% while the full prices for these passengers only decreases by 0.07%. Ticket prices
and full prices are lower across 80% of markets.
Two separate can be identied. First, the increase in the number of indirect routes
on a market B-D (i.e., increase in exogi) increases the level of competition for B-D pas-
sengers. This puts downward pressure on the ticket price for local B-D passengers. In
response, airlines shift away from local B-D passengers towards connecting A-E passen-
gers. Second, the exogenous increase in the demand from connecting A-E passengers
(i.e., increase in exogc) increases the number of connecting passengers on a market B-D.
This increase does not, however, lead to an increase in the number of ights an air-
line o¤ers on market B-D. Rather, airlines compensate for the increase in connecting
passengers by decreasing the number of local passengersthey serve.
These two e¤ects (i.e., increase in exogi and in exogc) both work to shift airlines away
from ying local passengers. The question remains as to which e¤ect might dominate.
Hence, I ask: holding the number of indirect routes constant, how does the increase
in the demand from connecting A-E passengers change ight frequency and quantity
decisions?
To provide an answer, I modify slightly the composition of the alliance sample. If
I update, as earlier, the values for variables ln(ROUTk), RMILESk,a n dTOTMILk,
I do not update anymore the values for ICON and IRATE. Namely, the value f the
42exogi in this modied sample is identical to its value in the estimation sample.
In this experiment, the local B-D passenger volume decreases on 73% of markets
and the median change is -27%. The number of connecting B-D passengers increases
slightly (median ¢ is 3.3%) across 77% of markets. The total passenger volume for an
airline with ights on market B-D on 62% of markets (median ¢ is -8%) while the ight
frequency changes little across markets (median ¢ is -1%).
Hence, airlines compensate for an increase in the number of connecting A-E passen-
gers by decreasing the number of local passengers. This makes the alliance experience
a di¤erent object from the hub-and-spoke one. The hub structure of the industry has
increased the availability of indirect routes for connecting passengers. This has been
argued to have increased ticket prices for local passengers. However, as Bamberger &
Carlton (1993) document, on markets to hub airports, ight frequencies rose su¢cently
that the total number of local passengers on these markets has actually increased. The
analysis in this paper suggests that the benets from increased ight frequency do not
materialize with regards to alliances. In fact, this paper nds little, if anything, to rec-
ommend about alliances between major US airlines (from a discussion based strictly on
the code-sharing aspect of alliances).
6.3.2. Future work
The marketing simulations do point to directions for future work. Allainces raise the
number of connecting A-E passengers an airline serves. I then nd that airlines overly
compensate for the increase in connecting passengers by substantially decreasing the
number of local passengers they serve. Some of the magnitude of this e¤ect can, no
doubt, be attributed to the estimation results.
First, the point estimates for the slopes in the inverse market demand for local B-D
passengers are low, thereby mitigating some of the impact of quantity changes on full
prices and ticket prices. Second, the high frequency delay valuation for connecting A-E
passengers, relative to local B-D passengers, certainly contributes to this over-reaction.
Having said this, these results have shown much robustness to trial estimation and
43prediction runs over time. The point is that, to my belief, they have shown su¢cient
robustness that I feel comfortable with the papers main ndings on alliances. It remains
that more work is needed to understand the nature of the externalities among local and
connecting passengers, to model demand systems for local passengers (Berry, Carnall
& Spiller (1995) is a step in that direction), and to characterize the deciion problem of
airlines with regards to connecting passengers.
447. Tables
Figure 1.
Table 1. Two-letter codes for U.S. airlines and number of sample markets (with 1, 2 airline(s) with ￿ights) with each airline.
Code AA CO DL NW UA US
Airline American Continental Delta Northwest United US Air(ways
# of markets with
1 airline 71 45 96 107 49 188
2 airlines 93 44 72 18 72 39
Note: The sample also includes markets with ￿ights by these airlines: Midwest Express, Kiwi, and America West Airlines.
45Table 3. Probit results for entry phase. Mean parameter values and associated t-statistics. Dependent
variable is dummy denoting whether airline 2 (as compared to airline 1) has ￿ights on the market.
Mean T-stat. Mean T-stat.
Variables in x*:
CONSTANT -12.120 -1.43 SHHUB1 2.542 0.59
MILES -0.351 -0.29 SHHUB2 17.363 2.79
ln(MILES) 29.727 2.81 CASM 8.368 2.38
ln(POP) -0.786 -1.43 LNCSBH -51.006 -2.18
AREA 0.369 2.14 MAINT -0.957 -1.08
INCF 2.108 4.12 FUEL 0.357 0.43
POPSQK 0.153 0.36 PIMIL 0.035 0.29
MAJHUB 0.433 1.76 ICON 1.082 3.80
HUBAIR 1.265 0.41 IMILES -2.089 -2.03
SLOT 13.320 0.42 IRATE 1.908 2.39
HFL -2.958 -3.84
AIRP -0.038 -0.31
ln(ROUT1) -12.433 -3.71 Variables in y*:
ln(ROUT2) 0.678 0.26
RMILES1 -0.118 -0.15 CPRICE 0.01028 2.57
RMILES2 -0.590 -1.04 PRICE -0.00799 -2.45
ln(ROUTD1) -2.130 -0.82 INDIR -0.00007 -1.28
ln(ROUTD2) 14.558 5.76 HDIR -0.00010 -3.24
HUB1 1.901 3.68 HCON 0.00002 1.08
HUB2 1.022 2.51 HFREQ 0.00210 1.07
-2 log Likelihood = -287.5
Maddala's pseudo R-square: 0.515
Mc Fadden's pseudi R-square:0.666
Note: The integers 1 and 2 following the name of a variable denote the airline to which the
variable applies. This probit regression examines the likelihood of entry of airline 2.
46Table 4. Mean (in $) cost of delay, frequency delay and full price valuation to a local B-D customer.
Mean cost of delay and full price valuation (in $)
Sample market with: 1 airline 2 airlines: 1st airline 2nd airline
Ticket price 183.15 196.64 190.44
Cost of stochastic delay 9.10 9.20 10.03
Cost of frequency dela 90.55 78.20 83.51
Full price 282.80 284.04 283.98
Cost of frequency delay valuation per daily flight (in $):
# of flights : 123456
Cost: 142.75 100.94 82.42 71.38 63.84 58.28
Change = -41.81 -18.52 -11.04 -7.54 -5.56
Change = worth (in $) of an extra daily flight to a local B-D customer
Note: The mean dollar valuations are the sample means for markets with 1 and 2 airlines with ￿ight(s).
Sample means are computed from the mean values of estimated parameters for the cost of delay function.
47Table 5. Mean and standard deviaton (S.d.) of estimated parameter values for variables in pro￿t-maximization model.
Stochastic delay parameters Frequency delay parameters




Var. AA, DL Others local connecting
Mean 0.0053 0.0083 1354 4410
S.d. 0.0014* 0.0014* 99* 338*
Estimates for the inverse local B-D demand 




Var. constant ln(POP) POPSQK INC MILES slope slope AA
Mean 1.7810 0.1358 -0.0664 0.0660 0.6621 0.00056 0.00285 0.1866
S.d. 0.1594* 0.0357* 0.0294* 0.0452 0.0391* 0.00014* 0.00091* 0.0859*
Estimates for the connecting A-E demand schedule
Param. d0 d1 d2 d3 d4 d d5
Var. constant ln(ROUT) RMILES HUB ln(MILES) slope DL
Mean 8.5592 3.5360 -0.5586 0.7131 5.6156 0.0086 0.6962
S.d. 0.2763* 0.4101* 0.0852* 0.0614* 0.4125* 0.00062* 0.0601*
Estimates for the connecting B-D reaction function
Param. l0 l1 l2 l3 l4 l
Var. constant  AREA ICON ln(MILES) IRATE slope
Mean -0.9419 0.0235 0.1453 0.0761 0.0517 25.42
S.d. 0.1614* 0.0050* 0.0121* 0.2997 0.0256* 3.88*
Estimates for the marginal cost per flight
Param. k0 k1 k2 k3 k4 k5 k6 k7
Var. constant FUEL CASM HUB MAJHUB SLOT ln(MILES) DL
Mean 7.2782 0.0578 -0.5081 0.4112 -0.1916 5.5586 3.2931 0.4968
S.d. 0.1895* 0.0421 0.0996* 0.0424* 0.0211* 2.5066* 0.2238* 0.0443*
Estimates for the marginal cost per local passenger
Param. w0 w1 w2 w3 w4 w5
Var. constant ln(CSBH) MAINT MAJHUB MILES HUBxMILES
Mean 0.6962 2.3931 -0.1422 0.1007 0.3377 0.1477
S.d. 0.2133* 0.7660* 0.0432* 0.0196* 0.0317* 0.0253*
Estimates for the marginal cost per connecting passenger
Param. y0 y1 y2 y3 y4
Var. constant TOTMIL ln(CSBH) MAJHUB HUB
Mean 0.4124 0.0494 4.3829 0.1156 -0.2313
S.d. 0.2299 0.0028* 0.7735* 0.0210* 0.0303*
Note: Parameter values in each of the specifications for the inverse local B-D demand, the marginal cost per local passenger,
and the marginal cost per connecting passenger have been divided by 100.
Note: In S.d row, * denotes signi￿cance at a 5% level.
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518. Appendix A: Descriptive Sample Statistics
Table A1. Descriptive sample statistics for the (605) markets with one airlines with ￿ights.
Variable name Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Scaling
factor
Local B-D price 1 183 43 61 330
Connecting B-D price 1 206 38 102 457
Local B-D quantity 1 7853 7064 345 58356
Connecting A-E quantity 1 13756 12227 258 106064
Flight frequency 1 284 164 77 1090
Connecting B-D quantity 1896 2255 40 18910
MILES 0.841 0.533 0.076 2.724 /1000
ln(POP) 3.931 0.542 2.092 5.264
AREA 3.539 1.495 0.732 8.834 /1000
INC  1.642 0.279 0.980 2.708 /1000
POPSQK 1.306 0.336 0.707 3.716 /1000
CASM 1 0.478 0.117 0.247 1.034 /10
FUEL 1 0.899 0.219 0.617 2.339 /1000
MAINT 1 0.446 0.216 0.129 2.229 /10
ln(CSBH 1) 0.273 0.016 0.224 0.354 /10
MAJHUB 0.266 0.450 0.000 2.000
HUB 1 0.884 0.320 0.000 1.000
HUB 2 0.167 0.373 0.000 1.000
SLOT 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.010 /100
HFL 0.834 0.225 0.287 1.606
AIRP 2.689 1.121 2.000 7.000
HUBAIR 0.117 0.060 0.000 3.000 /10
SHORTHUB 1 0.028 0.045 0.000 0.100 /10
SHORTHUB 2 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.100 /10
ln(ROUTD 1) 0.235 0.089 0.000 0.470 /10
ln(ROUTD 2) 0.152 0.086 0.000 0.364 /10
IMILES 1.208 0.581 0.201 3.076 /1000
Estimation sample:
ln(ROUT 1) 0.420 0.045 0.139 0.512 /10
ln(ROUT 2) 0.309 0.072 0.000 0.481 /10
RMILES 1 1.383 0.142 1.025 1.932
RMILES 2 1.415 0.201 1.008 2.238
TOTMIL 1 10.970 4.338 3.633 24.139 /100
ICON 1.295 0.643 0.100 3.400 /10
IRATE 1.591 0.374 1.040 2.992
Alliance sample:
ln(ROUT 1) 0.423 0.044 0.139 0.505 /10
RMILES 1 1.373 0.138 1.029 1.951
TOTMIL 1 10.976 4.358 3.459 24.607 /100
ICON 1.304 0.582 0.100 2.800 /10
IRATE 1.566 0.361 1.040 2.992
Predicted value for 
Pr( N = 0 | x*, y*) 0.925 0.164 0.079 1.000
The numbers 1 and 2 following the name of a variable designate airlines.
Airline 1 is the airline with flights on market B-D
Airline 2 denotes the airline with highest value for ln(ROUT), which has no
flights on market B-D (re: probit estimation of entry).
52Table A2. Descriptive sample statistics for the (185) markets with two airlines with ￿ights.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Scaling
factor
Local B-D price 1 197 60 65 370
Local B-D price 2 190 55 67 356
Connecting B-D price 1 217 46 110 370
Connecting B-D price 2 225 46 121 383
Local B-D quantity 1 12057 8911 1083 49347
Local B-D quantity 2 10233 9318 665 61999
Connecting A-E quantity 1 19208 15164 360 68823
Connecting A-E quantity 2 15507 14495 227 102634
Flight frequency 1 400 227 86 1052
Flight frequency 2 330 182 89 1302
Connecting B-D quantity 2578 2602 120 16300
MILES 0.954 0.548 0.067 2.704 /1000
ln(POP) 4.369 0.458 2.673 5.298
AREA 4.763 1.508 1.320 9.567 /1000
INC  1.782 0.259 1.252 2.595 /1000
POPSQK 1.371 0.317 0.864 2.573 /1000
CASM 1 0.422 0.097 0.247 0.737 /10
CASM 2 0.478 0.100 0.247 0.900 /10
FUEL 1 0.966 0.238 0.617 2.185 /1000
FUEL 2 0.940 0.281 0.677 2.668 /1000
MAINT 1 0.434 0.196 0.129 1.508 /10
MAINT 2 0.478 0.288 0.129 2.271 /10
ln(CSBH 1) 0.264 0.013 0.231 0.303 /10
ln(CSBH 2) 0.275 0.015 0.231 0.354 /10
MAJHUB 0.660 0.559 0.000 2.000
HUB 1 0.914 0.282 0.000 1.000
HUB 2 0.843 0.365 0.000 1.000
SLOT 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.020 /100
HFL 0.777 0.237 0.309 1.436
AIRP 2.951 1.190 2.000 6.000
HUBAIR 0.190 0.064 0.000 3.000 /10
SHORTHUB 1 0.020 0.040 0.000 0.100 /10
SHORTHUB 2 0.017 0.037 0.000 0.100 /10
ln(ROUTD 1) 0.273 0.078 0.000 0.428 /10
ln(ROUTD 2) 0.273 0.075 0.069 0.449 /10
IMILES 1.437 0.584 0.221 3.105 /1000
Estimation sample:
ln(ROUT 1) 0.411 0.054 0.139 0.498 /10
ln(ROUT 2) 0.414 0.054 0.161 0.504 /10
RMILES 1 1.409 0.159 1.085 2.099
RMILES 2 1.416 0.166 1.117 2.056
TOTMIL 1 12.375 4.274 5.317 24.615 /100
TOTMIL 2 12.022 4.527 4.522 25.345 /100
ICON 1.711 0.779 0.100 3.600 /10
IRATE 1.683 0.428 1.058 3.299
Alliance sample:
ln(ROUT 1) 0.416 0.052 0.139 0.502 /10
ln(ROUT 2) 0.417 0.054 0.161 0.502 /10
RMILES 1 1.376 0.150 1.081 1.860
RMILES 2 1.392 0.157 1.068 1.881
TOTMIL 1 12.383 4.330 5.304 24.654 /100
TOTMIL 2 12.087 4.538 5.295 26.169 /100
ICON 1.716 0.623 0.100 2.700 /10
IRATE 1.607 0.424 1.033 3.299
Predicted value for 
Pr( N = 1 | x*, y*) 0.757 0.280 0.003 1.000
The numbers 1 and 2 following the name of a variable designate airlines. 53POPUL
⁄ =
p








( sum of population at cities B and D)
1000 £ AREA
Note: * Maximal population gures (for the very large cities) were capped at 8,000,000.
9. Appendix B: The Data
9.1. Local vs. Connecting Tickets and Passengers
Databank 1A is a 10% random sample of all tickets sold each yearly quarter to passengers
in the USA. Fare, fare class, airline, and itinerary own are included but no time-of-day
or day-of-week information is provided. There may be several passengers listed on a
given ticket. The data are from the third quarter of 1993.
The ticket information in Databank 1A is reported on a ight segment basis. Flight
segments are associated with ight numbers and may consist in consecutive local ights
with same ight numbers. In this latter case, no information is provided on the interme-
diate city. I associate a ight segment from airport B to airport D with a local ight if
the airline issuing the ticket ies local from B to D. If the airline does not, the ticket in-
formation is disregarded (counting the passengers on these tickets as connecting/indirect
passengers does not modify the qualitative results of the paper).
Databank 1A does not classify tickets as one-way or roundtrip and only the full-
itinerary fare is reported. A two-segment ticket is counted as a roundtrip if the origin
city lies within 50 miles of the destination city. Roundtrip tickets are split into two
(directional) one-way tickets, and the full-itinerary fare is divided by two to yield the
one-way fares. All other two-segment tickets are one-way tickets. If a one-way ticket
between airports B and D contains only one ight segment, it is said to represent a
54local B-D passenger. If a one-way ticket between airports B and D contains two ight
segments, there are two possibilities. Let C be the intermediate city on this one-way
ticket. If both ight segments are with the same airline, the ticket is said to represent
an connecting B-D passenger, and a connecting passenger on each of market B-C and
C-D. If the ight segments are on di¤erent airlines (i.e., the passenger switched airlines
at airport C), the ticket is said to represent a local B-C and a local C-D passenger. The
one-way fare is, in this case, divided on the basis of the relative mileage of each ight
segment. These steps are repeated for tickets with up to 4 ight segments. One-way
tickets with 4 ight segments on the same airline are deleted. One-way tickets between
two airports B and D with total mileage 3.5 greater than the mileage of the shortest
available itinerary between B and D are deleted.
For each airline on market B-D, I have tickets for three categories of passengers: local
B-D, connecting A-E, and connecting B-D passengers. These tickets are split across two
fare classes: coach and rst/business.
9.2. Passenger Volumes
The passenger information is aggregated across tickets for market B-D to yield the
number of: local B-D coach passengers (DIR), local B-D business passengers (DIRF),
connecting A-E coach passengers (CON), connecting A-E business passengers (CONF),
connecting B-D coach passengers (IND), and connecting B-D business passengers (DIRF).
These numbers, computed from Databank 1A, represent a 10% random sample of all
passengers per airline on market B-D in the second quarter of 1993. Databank DS
T-100 provides the total number of passengers per airline on market B-D (TPASS) for
the second quarter of 1993. I reconcile the data across both databases. For the pur-





£ TPASS:The number of connecting A-E coach passengers is





£TPASS: The number of connecting B-D
passengers is equal to TIND=1 0¤ IND (i.e., Databank 1A is a 10% random sample
55of ticket prices) for lack of a better measure.
9.3. Fare Data
Databank 1A is known to contain some excessively high and low fares. I only consider
tickets with a fare of at least $10 and at most $1,400 per ight. For an itinerary with










: These price-per-mile cuto¤ values eliminate prohibitive fares on short-
mileage markets. Local and connecting fares are averaged across, respectively, Local
and connecting tickets. Since a ticket may list several passengers, the fares are weighted
by passengers when averaged.
9.4. Construction of Potential Connecting A-E Itineraries
These data are from the rst quarter of 1993. Potential connecting A-E itineraries for
an airline k on market B-D are created by appending the markets with ights from
airline k to one another. Markets are appended once, creating indirect routes with
one intermediate stop. The values for variables ln(ROUTk), ln(ROUTDk);R M I L E S k,
ICON, IMILES, TOTMILk, and CONMILk are created from these indirect routes.
To ensure consistency with the way I created the passenger volumes for connecting
passengers from Databank 1A, I only keep those potential A-E itineraries with total
mileage less than 3.5 times the mileage of the shortest possible (nonstop or indirect)
itinerary.
9.5. The Sample and Estimation Details
The sample data, used for estimation purposes, contain 605 markets with one airline
and 185 markets with two airlines.
The sample does not include: [1] markets with ights listed in the O¢cial Airline
Guide North American editions for July 1993, but not included in Databank DS T-100;
[2] markets with no reported price or passenger data; [3] markets where an airline has
56fewer than 60 ights over the quarter; and [4] markets with no cost data. The cost
data are obtained from the rst quarter of 1993 Aircraft Operating Costs and Statistics
(AQOCS) periodical. This is the last quarter for which these data are available since
AVMARK Inc. stopped its publication at that time. I construct this cost data by
reconciling the aircraft equipment information in Databank T-100 with the AQOCS
information. The implication of [4] is that I only get cost data if an airline was one the
market in the rst quarter of 1993. This eliminates an additional 15 sample markets
from the data.
The sample does not also include markets with Southwest and Alaska Airlines. The
data for Southwest Airlines is reported to Databank 1A in a fashion which does not allow
me to distinguish between local and connecting passengers. Alaska Airliness network
structure is fundamentally di¤erent from that of other US airlines.
9.6. List of the variables in x⁄ (continued from text)
There are three variables in x⁄ which are not discussed in the text: IMILES, SHORTHUBk,
and ln(ROUTDk).
The variable IMILES denotes the average mileage of indirect routes on market
B-D (variable IRATE = IMILES=MILES). SHORTHUBk is a dummy variable
denoting the presence of a hub airport for airline k on a market of 500 miles or less. In
its 1/10/94 issue, Airline Business magazine reports that the hub-and-spoke structure
increases costs sharply on short haul routes (mileage · 500) because it underutilizes
both aircraft and labor. ln(ROUTDk) is the (natural log of) the number of potential
connecting A-E markets airline k may draw passengers from. Both SHORTHUBk and
ln(ROUTDk) are constructed for two airlines as for the other network characteristics in
x⁄ (see part [2] in discussion of x⁄ in the text).
All three variables were initially part of the specications for the prot-maximization
models. However, I could not reject the null hypotesis that their parameter values
were equal to zero at a 10% signicance level. The variables were dropped from the
57specications for parsimony in the number of estimated parameter values.
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